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Abstract: 
This study uses automobile insurance loss costs as a proxy for tort system costs under contributory and 
comparative negligence standards. The principal finding is that insurance consumers in states that have adopted 
comparative negligence pay more for automobile liability insurance than do consumers in states that retain 
traditional contributory negligence. States that have adopted "pure comparative" negligence standards exhibit 
absolute higher costs than do states that have adopted "modified comparative" negligence standards, and both 
have higher costs than states that have retained contributory negligence. Moreover, when population density, 
accident fatalities, and no-fault insurance are allowed for, the average annual dollar loss cost increases are 
highest with pure comparative and lowest with contributory. To the extent that automobile insurance losses are 
an accurate proxy for the entire negligence and liability system, states with comparative negligence will have 
higher liability costs than will those with contributory negligence. 
 
Article: 
Change in the civil law in a way generally favorable to defendants has become known as "tort reform." Tort 
reform enjoys wide support from business as well as insurance company interests. It has attracted considerable 
attention in Congress, state legislatures, and in the press. Efforts have been underway at the federal level to 
bring about uniform product liability law, and in the course of so doing, to reform product liability law to make 
it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover in product actions. Senate bill 1400, introduced by Senator Robert 
Kasten (Republican, Wisconsin), would have effected numerous such reforms but was not successful in 1990.
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While federal efforts at tort reform have been restricted to products liability (the rationale being to promote 
international trade), many states have legislated tort reforms pertinent to general, professional, and automobile 
liability as well. Examples of tort reforms that various states have adopted include caps on noneconomic awards 
such as pain and suffering and punitive damages; limitations on attorney contingency fees; limitations on the 
application of the joint and several liability rule; mandatory use of structured settlements for personal injury 
awards; banning multiple punitive damage awards or requiring bifurcated trials for the award of punitive 
damages; and modifications of the collateral source rule. The Defense Research Institute (DRI) keeps track of 
and reports tort law changes.
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 They reported that 32 states adopted some "tort reform" during 1986 and that 22 
states adopted some tort reform proposals in 1987. Thus, there are numerous examples. According to DRI, 
Arizona and Oregon abolished joint and several liability in 1987; Texas, Montana, North Dakota, and Idaho 
limited its application. Iowa and Ohio permitted evidence of collateral sources. California, Georgia, Florida, and 
Virginia limited punitive damages. The foregoing is merely a scattering of examples and by no means a 
definitive report. The reader is referred to the DRI report. Virtually all of the reforms strengthen the position of 
the defendant and thus reduce the cost of liability insurance. 
 
Over the period 1978-1989, many states have replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence. 
This pattern of change is of particular interest because the findings presented in this article clearly indicate that 
the comparative negligence trend, in contrast with the direction of the tort reform agenda, is a "reform" that 
tends to increase the costs of the liability system, and thus of liability insurance, instead of reducing those costs. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the comparative negligence trend has contributed to the current high cost of the 
liability system. The implication then is that states that have contributory negligence should keep it unless they 
are willing to accept higher costs. The DRI report indicates that in 1987 Arizona and New Mexico passed legis-
lation that resulted in their moving away from comparative negligence and back toward contributory.
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Contributory Negligence Standards 
Civil law in the American legal system, although particular to each of the states, has a foundation in the 
common law of England, as it was adopted by the colonial governments in the seventeenth century. One of the 
strongest common law defenses is "contributory negligence." Contributory negligence is the rule that persons 
seeking damages from others should themselves be free of negligence or fault, however slight, in the causation 
of those damages. They should "come into court with clean hands." 
 
As recently as 1970, 38 states retained the traditional contributory negligence standard. At the present time, 
only five states retain a contributory negligence standard. Over the period 1971 to 1985, 33 states changed from 
the traditional contributory negligence standard to a system of "comparative negligence." Table 1 presents the 
50 states by negligence system and the year the most recent change became law. The five states which retain 
contributory negligence are Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, along with the 
District of Columbia. 
 
There are solid equity arguments for replacing the contributory negligence standard with comparative negli-
gence. The contributory rule can be very harsh. It is not difficult to understand why state legislatures have aban-
doned it. In its extreme application, slightly negligent persons have no recourse against grossly negligent per-
sons. For example, a driver failing to signal a turn or a pedestrian walking on the wrong side of the road could 
be barred recovery against a grossly negligent driver who causes them injury. 
 
When applicable, the contributory negligence defense may be a complete defense. The defendant need only 
show that the plaintiff is partially responsible for his or her own losses and then he or she is relieved of liability. 
One of the few counter-defenses available to the plaintiff is to show "gross negligence" by the defendant. 
Another counter-defense is to prove the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine of last clear chance states 
that even though there is contributory negligence by the plaintiff, the defendant had the last clear chance to 
avoid the accident. The last clear chance doctrine is also known as the "subsequent negligence" doctrine. Before 
the comparative negligence trend, many states adopted this doctrine as a humanitarian reform to reduce 
harshness in application of the contributory negligence rule. 
 
Defenders of the traditional contributory negligence rule argue that courts often mitigate its application. It is 
generally believed and often asserted (with no empirical evidence) that in practice many courts are inclined to 
ignore slight degrees of contributory negligence. On this basis it is frequently argued that it does not matter for 
insurance cost purposes whether a state has contributory negligence or comparative negligence.
4 
 
The problem with the mitigation argument is that it is neither uniformly applied nor even universally the rule. In 
some instances the bar to recovery is imposed before the case reaches the jury. Equity arguments led the legis-
latures of many states to abolish the contributory negligence standard and replace it with a comparative negli-
gence standard. Often such changes were adopted on the assumption that the cost implications of the change 
would not be significant. The continuing trend to comparative negligence suggests that some states might have 
adopted comparative negligence either without consideration of cost or while accepting the unsubstantiated 
assertion that insurance costs would be unaffected. The findings of this study indicate that insurance costs are 
likely to be higher with comparative negligence. 
 
 
Table 1 shows that some states adopted comparative negligence considerably before the now recurrent, volatile, 
and extreme hard market/soft market cycles of recent years. However, other states have adopted comparative 
negligence more recently, indeed as they were simultaneously adopting tort reforms designed to reduce the cost 
of the liability system and alleviate the insurance availability problems of hard markets. 
 
 
Comparative Negligence Standards 
omparative negligence is a system in which a plain- tiff's fault is compared with that of the defendant(s) and 
an allocation is then made as a basis for the awarding of damages.
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 A range of "comparative" fault standards has 
been adopted in 45 of the 50 states either through judicial decision or legislative action. The polar extreme from 
a contributory negligence standard is a "pure" comparative negligence standard under which a contributorily 
negligent plaintiff may recover even though his or her negligence is greater than the negligence of the defend-
ant. The plaintiff's damages will be reduced in proportion to the degree of negligence that is attributed to the 
plaintiff by the jury. With pure comparative negligence, a plaintiff can be primarily responsible for his or her 
own damages and still seek recovery from another who was responsible to a lesser degree. Such a rule coupled 
with the rule of joint and several liability opens "deep pocket" defendants to paying no matter how limited their 
contribution to accident causation. 
 
Pure comparative negligence is viewed by many as too radical a departure from the common law standard. The 
idea of "modified" comparative negligence has evolved as a compromise between pure comparative and 
contributory. Modified comparative negligence has more than one meaning. Some states, notably Nebraska and 
South Dakota, have a rule under which a contributorily negligent plaintiff whose negligence is "slight" in 
comparison to the defendant's "gross" negligence may recover, with damages reduced by the percentage of his 
or her fault. This is known as the "slight/gross rule." Many more states have adopted a standard known as the 
"49% rule," under which a plaintiff's contributory negligence will not bar recovery if his or her negligence is 
less than that of the defendant(s), with the plaintiff's damages reduced pro rata to the extent that his or her 
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negligence contributes to the accident. When the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than that of the 
defendant(s), the common-law contributory negligence rule is applied and recovery is barred. Some states have 
gone somewhat further in allowing a plaintiff to recover damages when his or her negligence is equal to that of 
a defendant. This is known as the "50% rule."                     
 
 These three formulations generally describe the concept of modified comparative negligence. The several states 
have significant differences among them. For purposes of this research and this article, the authors have adopted 
a trichotomous classification system: (1) contributory; (2) modified comparative, including slight/gross, 49% 
and 50%; and (3) pure comparative negligence. 
 
Research Purpose 
he purpose of this article is to identify and measure liability system cost differentials among states by neg-
ligence standard. Total liability system cost is not directly observable because uninsured and self-insured loss 
payments must be included. Still, automobile liability insurance costs serve as a good proxy. Statistical data on 
automobile insurance losses is available for a long period of time (1971-85) for almost all states. This data 
permits the comparison of automobile insurance loss costs among states. When classified by negligence 
standard, the state costs are a reliable proxy to compare cost differentials among negligence standards. 
 
Loss Costs. Two series of loss costs are used, one including only bodily injury loss costs and the other including 
property damage. Data for 47 states were obtained from the Insurance Services Office (ISO). Loss costs for 
each of the 47 states for which data were available (the other three states did not report to ISO over the period) 
for the period of 1971 through 1985 were calculated for each year. Bodily injury loss costs are the sum of the 
following losses divided by the number of earned car years: 
 
1. Bodily injury basic limits losses 
2. Plus bodily injury excess limits losses 
3. Plus medical payments losses 
4. Plus personal injury protection losses 
5. Plus uninsured and under-insured motorists losses For bodily injury plus property damage loss costs, the 
following are added on: 
6. Plus property damage basic limits losses 7. Plus property damage excess limits losses 
 
Both dependent variables were calculated on a state-bystate, year-by-year basis. Thus, there are data points rep-
resenting 47 states for 15 years. 
 
Negligence Systems. Table 1 classifies the states into contributory negligence, modified comparative 
negligence, and pure comparative negligence standards. The year that legislation became effective for modified 
and pure comparative negligence states is also listed. The dates on this list have been used to sort the cost 
observations among the negligence standards. Although there are only five states that retain contributory 
negligence today, it is important to note that many states have changed from contributory to comparative 
negligence during the period of time under consideration. Approximately 38 percent of the total state-year 
observations are classified as contributory, 44 percent as modified, and 18 percent as pure comparative 
negligence. All states in the analysis were classified as belonging to one of three standards identified below. 
Those states that changed from contributory negligence to a comparative negligence were classified first as 
contributory and later as the appropriate system to which they changed. The standards are as follows: 
 
1. Traditional contributory negligence, wherein recovery is barred to those plaintiffs whose negligence 
contributes to their own losses. 
2. "Pure" comparative negligence (adopted by 14 states by 1985), in which recovery is permitted even for 
those plaintiffs whose negligence is greater than that of another but with damages reduced pro rata to the 
degree of attributable negligence. 




Negligence System Cost Findings From 1971 to 1985 
The research explores whether comparative negligence (whether pure or modified) has an effect on the cost of 
automobile insurance. The null hypothesis is that 
 
 
states with comparative negligence will not have higher automobile (and other types of liability insurance by in-
ference) insurance costs than states with contributory negligence. The argument runs as follows. Comparative 
negligence permits partially negligent plaintiffs to recover, but plaintiff recoveries are offset to the extent that 
they contribute to their own losses. Thus, although more plaintiffs recover, they recover less. These offsets 
should reduce liability costs and counter the effects of more plaintiffs recovering. 
 
Table 2 presents the bodily injury loss costs by negligence system from 1971 to 1985. The table shows that in 
1971 the bodily injury loss cost in states with modified comparative negligence was $41.70 as compared to 
$42.66 for contributory negligence states, and $44.45 for states with pure comparative negligence. By 1985, a 
significant divergence had developed. The states with pure comparative negligence standards had the highest 
bodily injury loss costs of $149.38. The second highest was modified comparative negligence systems at 
$138.87. The states that continued to have the contributory negligence standard had a bodily injury loss cost of 
only $98.01. 
 
It must be emphasized that these three series do not represent a static series of data. During the period defined 
by the data, 1971 to 1985 inclusive, 33 states changed from contributory negligence to comparative negligence. 
The data in Table 2 represent insurance loss costs for these changing groups of states. In 1971, the states with 
modified comparative had slightly lower loss costs than did the states with contributory. Loss costs in the states 
with modified comparative negligence increased so much that by 1985 they were 41.7 percent greater than the 
loss costs for states with contributory. States with pure comparative negligence had total system pure premiums 
that were 52.4 percent higher than contributory states by 1985. Table 3 presents loss costs for bodily injury and 
property damage combined and reveals a similar pattern. 
 
Figure 1 is a least squares trend line of bodily injury loss costs from 1971 to 1985. The data show that com-
parative negligence states had higher absolute costs than contributory negligence states. The data also suggest 
that the costs are higher in states with pure comparative negligence than in those with modified comparative 
negligence. 
 
System Costs Controlling for State Characteristics from 1971 to 1985 
he foregoing analysis makes no allowance for characteristics of the individual states which could affect the 
overestimate or underestimate of liability insurance costs. A multiple regression analysis was conducted to hold 
constant the effects of other state characteristics. Specifically, allowance was made for the population density, 
fatalities per registered vehicle, and whether the state had a no-fault auto insurance system.
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When the influence of these factors is considered, we continue to find that cost increases were greater in states 







states retaining the contributory standard. Table 4 presents the dollar denominated average annual cost coeffic-
ients for each of the three negligence systems. For bodily injury, the increase in the average dollar loss cost per 
year is much higher for modified comparative system states than for contributory system states ($5.90 to $3.99). 
Pure comparative system states have an even higher average cost increase ($7.53 to $3.99). Assuming a 
common base year cost of $50 and applying the average dollar change for twenty years would result in modified 
comparative premiums more than 29 percent higher than those for comparative system states ($168 to $130). 
Pure system loss costs would be almost 55 percent greater than under contributory ($201 to $130). The second 
part of the table presents the differences as a percentage of base year system premiums. As with the dollar 
change, the longterm effects of such percentage differences are dramatic. 
 
When property damage loss costs are added to the analysis, cost differences continue in the same manner. 
However, the differences among the systems are not so great as for bodily injury alone. Comparative negligence 
seems to have its greatest upward cost pressure for bodily injury. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The data and findings reported in this study indicate quite clearly that states with comparative negligence 




sonable to expect that similar cost differentials would exist across the entire liability system. This study sug-
gests that to the extent businesses operate in states where comparative negligence is the rule, they should expect 
higher costs for general liability, product liability, and professional liability insurance. Consumers in those 
states should expect higher costs for homeowners insurance, as well as for automobile insurance. 
 
There is likewise a relationship between modified and pure comparative negligence. One would expect pure 
comparative, which allows recovery even for plaintiffs primarily responsible for their own losses, to be more 
expensive than modified comparative. The findings suggest that loss costs are much higher in pure comparative 
states than in modified, and that these costs are higher in comparative states than in contributory states. 
Moreover, when one controls for population density, fatalities, and no-fault, one discovers that the average cost 
increase per year for bodily injury liability is 48 percent higher for modified over contributory negligence, 28 
percent higher in pure than in modified, and 89 percent higher for pure over contributory. 
 
These findings clearly indicate that the legislatures of those five states that retain contributory negligence 
should adopt comparative negligence only with caution and with the expectation of higher insurance costs. If 
simultaneously considering other tort reforms, those legislatures should anticipate loss costs reductions being 
offset by loss cost increases from comparative negligence. States that already have comparative negligence 
should consider adopting a less costly alternative. 
 
It must be repeated that this study examines only the cost implications of comparative negligence standards. 
The qualitative arguments in favor of comparative negligence standards are compelling. But comparative negli-
gence must be regarded as a change that effects higher loss costs. The items on the tort reform agenda seek to 
effect lower loss costs. 
 
Endnotes 
1. Business Insurance, March 5, 1989, p. 2, includes a complete analysis of the law that was under 
consideration during the last session of Congress. It will doubtless return in the next Congress. 
2. The most recent report is "State Tort Reform in 1987," which appeared in For the Defense, February 1988, 
by Cinda L. Berry. Ms. Berry indicates by telephone that DRI prepares reports as activity warrants. 
3. Arizona changed from pure comparative negligence to modified. New Mexico adopted the rule that 
defendants will be only severally liable instead of jointly and severally in comparative fault actions 
(although excluding product liability and intentional conduct actions). The DRI report, referred to in note 
2 above, indicated that Nevada replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence. The writers 
think that to classify such a change as a "reform" is not appropriate in light of the findings presented in 
this paper. 
4. See Emmett Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance, John Wiley, 1989, p. 488. This was also 
found in a survey reported in J. E. Johnson and G. B. Flanigan, Update of an Investigation of the Relative 
Costs of Comparative Negligence Standards (1985), submitted by Joseph E. Johnson to the Judiciary 
Committees of the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina. 
5. There are numerous sources. For example, see W. Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," Michigan Law 
Review 51, 1953, p. 465 and V E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 2nd Edition, Allen Smith 
Company, Indianapolis, 1986. Also see Emmett Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance, John 
Wiley, 1989, p. 486, and V. E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 2nd Edition, Allen Smith Company, 
Indianapolis, 1986. 
6. The density of the population controls for differences in vehicular and pedestrian congestion. The fatality 
rate per registered vehicle proxies the effects of road condition, driver education programs, drunk driver 
enforcement, and other safety-related aspects. A dummy variable for states with no-fault recognizes 
potential differences in costs between tort and no-fault systems. The average dollar cost per year is 
captured by a trend variable. For bodily injury costs only, the adjusted R2 is 46.78 percent for contributory 
states, 62.66 percent for states with modified systems, and 50.96 percent for pure system states. The 
adjusted R2 for bodily injury plus property damage regressions is slightly higher for all three systems. In 
all six regressions, the time trend variable is highly significant at 0.0001, which shows significant cost 
increases each year, holding the other variable constant. It is these cost increases that are shown in Table 
4. No problems of excessive multicollinearity or autocorrelation appeared in the regressions. 
